Though judicial review is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, it is clear that the most of the Founders had the notion that the federal courts would take some role in keeping Congress within its constitutional boundaries. The classic statement of this perspective is Hamilton's Federalist 78.
Here, Hamilton makes the case that judicial review is a natural extension of courts' tradiutional powers and that judicial independence is "peculiarly important" for preserving constitutional limits on government power. It is fair to say that Hamilton's views on the matter are shared by a very large majority of legal scholars, historians, and political scientists.
And yet, Hamilton's views on the matter were not unchallenged at the Founding. The Antifederalist "Brutus," for example, was substantially critical of the form of the judiciary in the proposed Constitution. In his Essay XV, Brutus argued that handing the power of judicial review over to appointed and life-tenured judges was tantamount to surrendering popular control of the Constitution and that judges without political accountability would be dangerous to the people.
The issue of the importance of judicial independence for maintaining limited constitutional government is a vexing one, and I think that we have more assumptionsd than hard evidence on the point. Still, as citizens, it's important to weigh the extent to which granting extensive political independence to courts divorces the constitution from the people.
